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Abstract
Quantum mechanics may be formulated as Sensible Quantum Mechanics
(SQM) so that it contains nothing probabilistic except conscious perceptions.
Sets of these perceptions can be deterministically realized with measures given
by expectation values of positive-operator-valued awareness operators. Ratios
of the measures for these sets of perceptions can be interpreted as frequency-
type probabilities for many actually existing sets. These probabilities gener-
ally cannot be given by the ordinary quantum “probabilities” for a single set
of alternatives. Probabilism, or ascribing probabilities to unconscious aspects
of the world, may be seen to be an aesthemamorphic myth.
1 Introduction
Probabilities are the most mysterious aspect of quantum mechanics, in my mind.
There is first the mystery of which amplitudes should be squared to give prob-
abilities. Should it be the amplitudes of “measurement outcomes”? If so, what
constitutes a “measurement”? Should it be the amplitudes of all “events,” whether
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or not they is “measured”? If “events” are represented by projection operators,
should one just calculate them for one set that commutes and adds up to the iden-
tity operator? If so, which such set of “events” should one choose? Should one
instead calculate probabilities for “histories”? If so, which set of “histories” should
one choose?
There is second the even deeper mystery of what the resulting probabilities mean.
One interpretation is that they are “propensities” for certain “possibilities” to be
“actualized.” In this interpretation a unique one of the possible “measurement out-
comes,” “events,” or “histories” actually occurs, with the probability assigned to it
by quantum mechanics, and the other possibilities do not. But then what chooses
the set of “measurement outcomes,” “events,” or “histories”? For example, if it is
the set of events given by a set of commuting rank-one projection operators onto
an orthonormal basis for the Hilbert space of states, what determines this basis?
Furthermore, once the set is chosen so that the quantum-mechanical probabilities
can be determined from the state, what is it that actually determines which “possi-
bility” from that set is “actualized”? If the probabilities of quantum mechanics are
interpreted in this propensity sense as indicating fundamental uncertainties, then
quantum mechanics itself would be uncertain and incapable of being a complete
theory of the universe in which only certain possibilities are actualized.
The last question above, but not the two preceding it, can be avoided by tak-
ing the alternative interpretation that probabilities are “frequencies” for many “ac-
tualities.” This is a “many-worlds” interpretation [1]. If the set of possibilities
(now all considered to be actualities, at least all those possibilities with nonzero
frequency-type probabilities) were determined, and if this many-worlds interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics were a true representation of the universe, then this
quantum mechanical theory would be definite and complete, for it would completely
specify the frequency of all actualities.
Of course, there is the technical problem of interpreting the probabilities as
frequencies of a finite integral number of actualities if any of the probabilities are
irrational numbers, but one can circumvent that difficulty by interpreting the prob-
abilities as ratios of measures of a continuum of actualities (though perhaps at the
cost of no longer having a clear intuitive grasp of the concept in terms of familiar
objects, but that should be no fundamental difficulty, other than for one’s intuition).
However, there still remains within this many-worlds quantum theory the unre-
solved question of what the set of actualities is. This certainly does not make the
many-worlds interpretation worse then those with a propensity interpretation of the
probabilities, but since those other interpretations have the even more basic problem
of not saying which possibilities are actualized, it is often overlooked that they also
share with the many-worlds interpretation the more subtle problem of which set of
possibilities (actualities in the many-worlds interpretation) is picked out.
Here I shall summarize a version of quantum mechanics called Sensible Quantum
Mechanics (SQM) [2-6] in which not only are probabilities frequencies (or, more
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precisely, ratios of measures of sets) rather than propensities, but also probabilities
apply only to conscious perceptions. The unconscious aspect of our universe (here
called the quantum world) is completely described by the quantum state and its
complex amplitudes (the expectation values of all operators, which obey some algebra
which is also characteristic of the quantum world). The measures in the conscious
world are given by a subset of these amplitudes, the expectation values of a certain
preferred set of positive awareness operators.
In Sensible Quantum Mechanics, probabilism, or interpreting the unconscious
quantum world itself probabilistically, is an aesthemamorphic myth (from the Greek
αισθησισ: perception, sense, sensation), rather analogous to the myth of animism
that ascribes living properties to inanimate objects. It may be a convenient myth,
just as animism is a when we say such things as, “Water seeks its own level,”
but it would give us a better understanding if we recognized it as a myth. Thus
probabilities don’t (apply to) “matter”; they are only in the “mind.”
Also in SQM, the quantum state never collapses. All sets of perceptions with
positive measure (given by the expectation values of different awareness operators in
the single unchanged Heisenberg state of the universe) actually occur, so the theory
is probabilistic not in the propensity sense but only in the sense of “frequencies” (as
ratios of the measures of the sets): it is a many-perceptions theory.
The measure of sets of perceptions in the conscious world permits a test in
principle of whether a perception is typical. The Weak Anthropic Principle can be
generalized to the Conditional Aesthemic Principle: our conscious perceptions are
likely to be typical perceptions in the conscious world with its measure.
2 Axioms of Sensible Quantum Mechanics
Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) is given by the following three fundamental
postulates [4]:
Quantum World Axiom: The unconscious “quantum world” Q is completely
described by an appropriate algebra of operators and by a suitable state σ (a positive
linear functional of the operators) giving the expectation value 〈O〉 ≡ σ[O] of each
operator O.
Conscious World Axiom: The “conscious world”M , the set of all perceptions
p, has a fundamental measure µ(S) for each subset S of M .
Quantum-Consciousness Connection: The measure µ(S) for each set S of
conscious perceptions is given by the expectation value of a corresponding “aware-
ness operator” A(S), a positive-operator-valued (POV) measure [7], in the state σ
of the quantum world:
µ(S) = 〈A(S)〉 ≡ σ[A(S)]. (1)
Here a perception p is the entirety of a single conscious experience, all that one
is consciously aware of or consciously experiencing at one moment, the total “raw
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feel” that one has at one time, or [8] a “phenomenal perspective” or “maximal
experience.” [If a set of perceptions S is called a “point of view” (P.O.V.), then one
may say that A(S) is a POV for a P.O.V.]
Since all sets S of perceptions with µ(S) > 0 really occur in SQM, it is com-
pletely deterministic if the quantum state and the A(S) are determined: there are
no random or truly probabilistic elements. Nevertheless, because SQM has measures
for sets of perceptions, one can readily calculate ratios that can be interpreted as
conditional probabilities. For example, one can consider the set of perceptions S1 in
which there is a conscious memory of having tossed a coin fifty times, and the set
S2 in which there is a conscious memory of getting less than ten heads. Then one
can interpret
P (S2|S1) ≡ µ(S1 ∩ S2)/µ(S1) (2)
as the conditional probability that the perception is in the set S2, given that it is
in the set S1, that is, that a perception included a conscious memory of getting less
than ten heads, given that it included a conscious memory of having tossed a coin
fifty times.
In SQM the set M of all perceptions is basic, and one can choose out of this
set any subset S (by, e.g., the contents of the perceptions p themselves, or else by
properties of the corresponding awareness operator A(S) of the subset S), but there
is no absolutely preferred equivalence between perceptions that could be used to
classify them uniquely (except in ad hoc ways) into sets corresponding to individual
persons or minds. Of course, just as one can for objects such as “chairs” or “protons”
that also presumably do not have fundamental definitions in the ultimate theory of
the universe, one can make up ad hoc definitions that may be very good in practice
for classifying perceptions into persons or minds. But that classification is not
fundamental to SQM. As Hume [9] wrote, “what we call a mind, is nothing but a
heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and
suppos’d, tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and identity.” Since
perceptions (or what might crudely be called sensations) are basic to SQM, but not
groupings of them into minds, one might call SQM Mindless Sensationalism.
3 Testing and Comparing SQM Theories
Since physics should be rooted in experience, we should have a way to test and
compare different candidate SQM theories. If one had a theory in which only a small
subset of the set of all possible perceptions is predicted to occur, one could simply
check whether an experienced perception is in that subset. If it is not, that would
be clear evidence against that theory. Unfortunately, in almost all SQM theories,
almost all sets of perceptions are predicted to have a positive measure, so these
theories cannot be excluded so simply. For such many-perceptions theories, the best
one can hope for seems to be to find likelihood evidence for or against it. Even how
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to do this is not immediately obvious, since SQM theories merely give measures
for sets of perceptions rather than the existence probabilities for any perceptions
(unless the existence probabilities are considered to be unity for all existing sets
of perceptions, i.e., all those with nonzero measure, but this is of little help, since
almost all sets exist in this sense).
In order to test and compare SQM theories, it helps to hypothesize that the set
M of all possible conscious perceptions p is a suitable topological space with a prior
measure
µ0(S) =
∫
S
dµ0(p). (3)
Then, because of the linearity of positive-valued-operator measures over sets, one
can write each awareness operator as
A(S) =
∫
S
E(p)dµ0(p), (4)
a generalized sum or integral of “experience operators” or “perception operators”
E(p) for the individual perceptions p in the set S. Similarly, one can write the
measure on a set of perceptions S as
µ(S) = 〈A(S)〉 =
∫
S
dµ(p) =
∫
S
m(p)dµ0(p), (5)
in terms of a measure density m(p) that is the quantum expectation value of the
experience operator E(p) for the same perception p:
m(p) = 〈E(p)〉 ≡ σ[E(p)]. (6)
Now one can test the agreement of a particular SQM theory with a conscious
observation or perception p by calculating the typicality T (p) that the theory assigns
to the perception: Let S≤(p) be the set of perceptions p
′ with m(p′) ≤ m(p). Then
T (p) ≡ µ(S≤(p))/µ(M). (7)
For p fixed and p˜ chosen randomly with the infinitesimal measure dµ(p˜), the prob-
ability that T (p˜) is less than or equal to T (p) is
PT (p) ≡ P (T (p˜) ≤ T (p)) = T (p). (8)
Thus the typicality Ti(p) of a perception p is the probability in a particular SQM
theory or hypothesis Hi that another random perception will have its typicality
less than or equal to that of p itself. One can interpret it as the likelihood of the
perception p in the particular theory Hi, not for p to exist, which is usually unity
(interpreting all perceptions p with m(p) > 0 as existing), but for p to have a
measure density, and hence a typicality, no larger than it has.
Once the typicality Ti(p) can be calculated for an experienced perception as-
suming the theory Hi, one approach is to use it to rule out or falsify the theory if
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the resulting typicality is too low. Another approach is to assign prior probabili-
ties P (Hi) to different theories (presumably neither propensities nor frequencies but
rather purely subjective probabilities, perhaps one’s guess for the “propensities” for
God to create a universe according to the various theories), say
P (Hi) = 2
−ni, (9)
where ni is the rank of Hi in order of increasing complexity (my present favorite
choice for a countably infinite set of hypotheses if I could do this ranking, which is
another problem I will not further consider here). Then one can use Bayes’ rule to
calculate the posterior probability of the theory Hi given the perception p as
P (Hi|p) =
P (Hi)Ti(p)∑
j P (Hj)Tj(p)
. (10)
There is the potential technical problem that one might assign nonzero prior
probabilities to hypotheses Hi in which the total measure µ(M) for all perceptions
is not finite, so that the right side of Eq. (7) may have both numerator and denomi-
nator infinite, which makes the typicality Ti(p) inherently ambiguous. To avoid this
problem, one might use, instead of Ti(p) in Eq. (10), rather
Ti(p;S) = µi(S≤(p) ∩ S)/µi(S) (11)
for some set of perceptions S containing p that has µi(S) finite for each hypothesis
Hi. This is related to a practical limitation anyway, since one could presumably only
hope to be able to compare the measure densities m(p) for some small set of per-
ceptions rather similar to one’s own, though it is not clear in quantum cosmological
theories that allow an infinite amount of inflation how to get a finite measure even
for a small set of perceptions [6]. Unfortunately, even if one can get a finite measure
by suitably restricting the set S, this makes the resulting P (Hi|p;S) depend on this
chosen S as well as on the other postulated quantities such as P (Hi).
4 Properties of Experience Operators
Once one has a bare quantum theory (algebra of operators and quantum state)
for the quantum world, and the set M of possible perceptions p with a prior mea-
sure for integrating any measure density m(p) by Eq. (5) to get the corresponding
measure µ(S) for sets S of perceptions p, the remaining feature of SQM to be de-
termined is the experience or perception operators E(p), whose expectation values
give the measure density by Eq. (6). Assuming that the framework of SQM is cor-
rect and that one knows what the set of possible perceptions is, the uncertainty of
the E(p) encapsulates our ignorance of how the quantum world produces conscious
perceptions.
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(One might object that even if we knew the full SQM theory with all the E(p)’s,
we would still not know how the quantum world produces conscious perceptions.
This would be like saying that even if we have a law for electromagnetism, we would
still not know how a charged particle produces an electromagnetic field. But if we can
say what perceptions or what fields are produced in whatever various circumstances
that may occur, this is about as good an understanding as we can hope to get in
physics, though of course we would hope for the simplest description so that we can
describe as many things as possible with a small number of general principles.)
In [4] a large number of hypotheses were given (some compatible with each other,
but most incompatible alternatives) for the experience or perception operators E(p).
Here I shall not repeat most of them but shall simply note that the the strongest
one I am presently fairly comfortable with (though without high confidence that it is
true) is the Commuting Projection Hypothesis of SQMPC: E(p) = P (p), a projec-
tion operator depending upon the perception p, with [P (p), P (p′)] = 0 for all pairs of
perceptions p and p′. In many cases I would also think it might a plausibly good ide-
alization to make the Assumption of Perception Components, that each perception
p itself consists of a set of discrete components ci(p) contained within the perception,
say p = {ci(p)}. Then I would think that, at least as a reasonably good approxima-
tion, one might strengthen the Commuting Projection Hypothesis of SQMPC to the
Commuting Product Projection Hypothesis of SQMPPC: E(p) =
∏
i P [ci(p)], where
each P [ci(p)] is a projection operator that depends on the perception component
ci(p), with all the P [ci(p)]’s commuting.
Then, although it is by no means required in SQM and indeed might be mis-
leading in circumstances in which these hypotheses do not hold, one might find it
heuristically advantageous to say that if the quantum state of the universe is repre-
sented by the pure state |ψ〉, one can ascribe to the perception p the pure Everett
“relative state”
|p〉 =
E(p)|ψ〉
‖ E(p)|ψ〉 ‖
=
E(p)|ψ〉
〈ψ|E(p)E(p)|ψ〉1/2
. (12)
Alternatively, if the quantum state of the universe is represented by the density
matrix ρ, one can associate the perception with a relative density matrix
ρp =
E(p)ρE(p)
Tr[E(p)ρE(p)]
. (13)
Then if one is willing to say that m(p) = Tr[E(p)ρ] is the absolute probability
for the perception p (which might seem natural at least when E(p) is a projection
operator, though I am certainly not advocating this na¨ıve interpretation), one might
also na¨ıvely interpret Tr[E(p′)ρp] as the conditional probability of the perception p
′
given the perception p.
Another thing one can do with two perceptions p and p′ is to calculate an “overlap
fraction” between them as
f(p, p′) =
〈E(p)E(p′)〉〈E(p′)E(p)〉
〈E(p)E(p)〉〈E(p′)E(p′)〉
. (14)
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If the quantum state of the universe is pure, this is the same as the overlap prob-
ability between the two Everett relative states corresponding to the perceptions:
f(p, p′) = |〈p|p′〉|2. Thus one might in some sense say that if f(p, p′) is near unity,
the two perceptions are in nearly the same one of the Everett “many worlds,” but
if f(p, p′) is near zero, the two perceptions are in nearly orthogonal different worlds.
However, this is just a manner of speaking, since I do not wish to say that the
quantum state of the universe is really divided up into many different worlds. In a
slightly different way of putting it, one might also propose that f(p, p′), instead of
Tr[E(p′)ρp], be interpreted as the conditional probability of the perception p
′ given
the perception p. Still, I do not see any evidence that f(p, p′) should be interpreted
as a fundamental element of Sensible Quantum Mechanics. In any case, one can be
conscious only of a single perception at once, so there is no way in principle that
one can test any properties of joint perceptions such as f(p, p′).
5 Perceptions of Schro¨dinger’s Cat
The framework of Sensible quantum mechanics allows one to discuss questions
of what one would be perceived in the experiment of Schro¨dinger’s cat [10], and a
detailed SQM theory would answer such questions. One such question is whether
one could directly perceive a superposition of, say, alive plus dead.
If perceptions are of alive (A) versus dead (D), so 〈E(palive)〉 ∝ 〈|A〉〈A|〉 and
〈E(pdead)〉 ∝ 〈|D〉〈D|〉, then in an appropriate basis for this the quantum state
resulting from the idealized Schro¨dinger’s cat experiment may have the form
|ψ〉 ∝ |A〉head|A〉body|A〉rest + |D〉head|D〉body|D〉rest + (other terms), (15)
where I have conceptually divided the system (e.g., the universe) into the head of
the cat, the body of the cat, and the rest of the universe. Here “(other terms)”
denotes other components of the quantum state in which the Schro¨dinger’s cat
experiment has not been done and there is no perception that it has; I shall here
ignore the other irrelevant perceptions whose measure arises from such terms. One
now finds that in this idealized state there is an equal nonzero measure density for
the perceptions phead alive, body alive,. . . and phead dead, body dead,. . . , but no
measure density for phead alive, body dead,. . . or phead dead, body alive,. . . . In
other words, there is not a unique perception of whether the cat is alive or dead,
but in each perception that the experiment has been done (given by part of the
unspecified perception components denoted by the . . . in the subscripts for the p’s),
there is perfect agreement that the head and body are either both alive or both
dead.
If, on the other hand, perceptions were of the linear combinations |+〉 ∝ |A〉+|D〉
and |−〉 ∝ |A〉 − |D〉, so 〈E(p+)〉 ∝ 〈|+〉〈+|〉 and 〈E(p−)〉 ∝ 〈|−〉〈−|〉, then in the
appropriate basis for this the quantum state has the form
|ψ〉 ∝ |+〉head|+〉body|+〉rest + |−〉head|−〉body|+〉rest +
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|+〉head|−〉body|−〉rest + |−〉head|+〉body|−〉rest + (other terms). (16)
In this case one one gets equal measure densities for all four possible perceptions
p++, p−−, p+−, and p−+, so only 2
−1 of the perceptions agree about the head and
body.
If one had instead conceptually divided the cat into n > 2 parts which were all
either dead or alive, then if perception components were of that property (dead or
alive), there would be, in the idealized Schro¨dinger’s cat experiment, just as in the
n = 2 case above, no single perception of whether the cat or any of its parts were
dead or alive, but within each perception there would be total agreement between
the perception components of whether each part of the cat were dead or alive, so
there would be no confusion within any single multi-component perception. On the
other hand, if perception components were of the + and − properties of each part
of the cat, all possible 2n orders would occur with equal weight, so only a fraction
of 21−n of the perceptions would have agreement for all n parts of the cat., and in
the remaining bulk of the perceptions there would be confusion as to whether the
entire cat is dead or alive.
Note that without knowing what the experience operators actually are, this anal-
ysis cannot answer the question of how each part of the cat is perceived. However, it
does show that if the perception is to give agreement between the components corre-
sponding to the different parts of the cat, and if (as in the idealized Schro¨dinger’s cat
experiment) there is a complete correlation between the parts as to whether they are
alive or dead, then the perception components should be of whether the correspond-
ing part of the cat is alive or dead, rather than being of the linear combinations +
or −. This does seem to fit our experience much better than the other possibility,
so empirically we can say that we tend to have relatively unconfused perceptions, at
least compared to the maximum confusion conceivable. There is still the mystery of
why this is so, and I am tempted to paraphrase Einstein to say, “The most confusing
thing about perceptions is that they are not generally confusing.”
One possible attempt at an explanation is to argue that if our perceptions were
confused, we would not respond coherently to our environment and so would not
survive. However, this assumes that our perceptions really do affect our actions
(e.g., part of the quantum state) rather than just being passively produced by the
quantum state as epiphenomena. SQM describes only the production of perceptions
(i.e., the determination of their measure) by the quantum state and the awareness
or experience operators but does not describe any action of the perceptions back on
the state. If the state were really unaffected by the perceptions, and if the survival
of organisms can be described by the properties of the state, then this survival
would be totally unaffected by the perceptions, and, in particular, by whether they
are confused or unconfused. Of course, there may be some other explanation of
the coherence of perceptions besides the survival value for an organism, but the
attractiveness of that particular explanation does at least suggest that perceptions
do have an action back on the quantum state. Another suggestive argument for
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the same conclusion, and a sketch of how this back reaction might fit in with the
presently known laws of physics, will be given near the end of this paper.
6 Location and Time of Perceptions in QFT
In general, perceptions p are associated with experience operators E(p) (or sets
of perceptions with awareness operators A(S)), but not with times or locations.
Instead, Sensible Quantum Mechanics transcends quantum theories in which space
and time are fundamental.
But for quantum field theory (QFT) in a classical curved globally hyperbolic
background spacetime without symmetries (so that points can be uniquely identified
by the background), one can make an ad hoc definition of a time and location
associated with a perception p: Choose a one-parameter (time t) sequence of Cauchy
hypersurfaces. For each time t, point P on the hypersurface, and radius r, let
E ′(p; t, P, r) be E(p) written in terms of the fields and conjugate momenta at t but
with terms at distances greater than r from the point P truncated. Define
F (p; t, P, r) =
〈E(p)E ′(p; t, P, r)〉〈E ′(p; t, P, r)E(p)〉
〈E(p)E(p)〉〈E ′(p; t, P, r)E ′(p; t, P, r)〉
, (17)
r(p, t, P ) = min [r : F (p; t, P, r) = 1/2], (18)
r(p; t) = min [r(p; t, P ) : P on hypersurface of time t], (19)
P (p; t) = P such that F (p; t, P, r(p; t)) = 1/2, (20)
tp = t such that r(p; t) = min [r(p; t
′) : t′], (21)
rp = r(p; tp) = min [r(p; t) : t], (22)
Pp = P (p; tp). (23)
This locates the perception as crudely occurring mostly within the smallest possible
ball of geodesic radius rp from the point Pp on the hypersurface at time tp.
7 Questions and Speculations
One can use the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics to ask questions and
make speculations that might be difficult otherwise:
1. What regions (presumably inside brains) are most responsible for perceptions?
2. Does the region depend significantly on the character of the perception?
3. Can one have two quite different perceptions, p and p′, with f(p, p′) ≈ 1 (i.e.,
in nearly the “same Everett world”), tp = tp′ (i.e., most localized at the same times),
and with both Pp and Pp′ in the same brain? We generally believe this is possible
for two different brains, but can one single brain have two different perceptions (and
not just two different components of a single perception) at once?
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4. If so, can the two balls of radius rp and rp′ overlap? (I.e., can the same region
of the brain have two different perceptions at once?)
5. How does the measure density m(p) depend on brain characteristics?
6. Is it correlated with intelligence, so that in some sense brighter brains give a
larger measure of perceptions?
7. Does this explain why you perceive yourself as human rather than insect,
although there are many more insects than humans?
8. Does this explain why you may perceive yourself as more intelligent than most
other people? (In other words, are you more typical, when weighted by the measure
for perceptions, than you might otherwise have thought ?)
9. Can electronic computers give significant measures for perceptions?
10. Are human brains more efficient than most electronic computers, no mat-
ter how intelligent (at least in information-processing capabilities), in producing
conscious perceptions? (If so, the measure for perceptions would not be correlated
purely with intelligence in this sense.)
11. Does this explain why you do not perceive yourself as one of trillions of
self-replicating computers that might colonize the Galaxy?
12. Over what region of spacetime do human brains have the dominant measure
of conscious perceptions in our Everett world ρp?
The Conditional Aesthemic Principle would predict that our conscious percep-
tions are likely to be typical perceptions in the conscious world with its measure.
Thus it would predict that it is unlikely that the overwhelming bulk of conscious
perceptions in the universe would have a measure density (and hence a typicality)
larger than ours, though of course it allows for the possibility that many other types
of perceptions could have comparable measure densities and typicalities, so it does
not predict that the dominant perceptions should be peculiarly human.
8 An Analogy for the Mind-Body Problem
To explain the mind-body relation in Sensible Quantum mechanics in terms of
an analogy, consider a classical model of spinless massive point charged particles
and an electromagnetic field in Minkowski spacetime. The charged particles can be
considered to be analogous to the quantum world (or the quantum state part of it),
and the electromagnetic field can be considered to be analogous to the conscious
world (the set of perceptions with its measure µ(S)).
At the level of a simplistic materialist mind-body philosophy, one might merely
say that the electromagnetic field is part of, or perhaps a property of, the material
particles. One cannot say for certain that this is wrong, but it does not lead to
much understanding of the electromagnetic field merely to say that. Similarly, one
cannot rule out the claim that consciousness is merely a property of the quantum
world, but just saying that does not give much insight into consciousness.
11
At the level of Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the charged particle worldlines are
the analogue of the quantum state, the retarded electromagnetic field propagator
(Coulomb’s law in the nonrelativistic approximation) is the analogue of the aware-
ness operators, and the electromagnetic field determined by the worldlines of the
charged particles and by the retarded propagator is the analogue of the conscious
world. (Here one can see that this analogue of Sensible Quantum Mechanics is valid
only if there is no free incoming electromagnetic radiation.)
One might propose an extension of Sensible Quantum Mechanics, say Sensational
Quantum Mechanics, in which the conscious world may affect the quantum world.
The analogue of this would be the case in which the charged particle worldlines are
partially determined by the electromagnetic field through the change in the action
it causes. (This more unified framework better explains the previous level but does
not violate its description, which simply had the particle worldlines given.)
(A motivation for considering the possibility that the conscious world might have
an effect on the quantum world, besides the actual effect in the electromagnetic
analogue being considered here, was given at the end of the section above on the
experiment of Schro¨dinger’s cat. Another motivation which occurred to me earlier
would be the desire to explain the correlation between will and action, i.e., why I
feel I do as I please. An easy way to circumvent the objection that such an effect
would violate the known laws of physics, in particular those of energy-momentum
conservation, would be to have desires in the conscious world affect, in a coordinate-
invariant way that would thus preserve energy-momentum conservation, the action
functional that is used in a path integral giving the quantum state.)
At a yet higher level in the analogue, there is the possibility of incoming free
electromagnetic waves, which would violate the previous frameworks that assumed
the electromagnetic field was uniquely determined by the charged particle worldlines.
An analogous suggestion for intrinsic degrees of freedom for consciousness has been
made by Linde [11].
Finally, at a still higher level, there might be an even more unifying framework
in which both charged particles and the electromagnetic field are seen as modes of
a single entity (e.g., to take a popular current speculation, a superstring). Such
a more unified framework for the mind-body problem might exist as well, but I
suspect that one will not get to such a framework with any significant content
without examining the lower levels first and then hopefully finding a complete unified
description from which the lower levels can be shown to emerge by some sort of
reduction or approximation.
Thus Sensible Quantum Mechanics may be only a framework for the next step
in understanding the relation between mind and body or between conscious ob-
servations and quantum mechanics. However, it does seem to give a glimpse of
a yet-to-be-completed quantum theory that, when filled in in detail, could not be
criticized for being inherently incomplete in not predicting precisely what happens
during observations.
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I perceive that my thoughts on this subject have benefited by interactions with
many people listed in my more complete account in [4], but here I especially want
to acknowledge the continued e-mail interaction with my previous co-author Shelly
Goldstein [12] (whom I shall first meet in person only after writing these words).
Financial support has been provided by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Re-
search Council of Canada.
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